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marks a step that few now fully comprehend and
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emphatic structure thematically bonded to Southwestern culture. The school is now ·e mbodied in distinguished alumni, members of the Bench and Bar,
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the law school: but the greater school plant now
under construction will complete the measure of the
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THE COVER
(L to R) Louis Guido, Sr., Very Reverend
Louis J. Blume, S.M., and Cosmo Guido are
shown at the signing of the Law Center
contract.

(L to R) Dean Ernest Raba, Father Blume, President of St. Mary's, and Brooks Martin, Architect, look
over the sketches of the Law Center soon to take form on the Woodlawn Campus.

'$1,709,000 CONTRACT SIGNED FOR NEW LAW CENTER
St. Mary's University has signed a contract
for the construction of a new law center to be built
on its Woodlawn campus as part of the university's
current ten-year $25 million expansion program.
The contract was awarded by Very Rev. Louis
J. Blume, SM, president, to Guido Brothers Construction Company of San Antonio on a low bid of
$1,709,000.
The three-building center will include a classroom building, faculty office building, and law
library. The design is Texas colonial. Architect is
Brooks Martin, AlA, San Antonio.
Construction will start immediately with completion scheduled for fall, 1967, when the St. Mary's
law school will move from its downtown location to
the main campus.
Six other buildings already are under construction on the St. Mary's campus, Fr. Blume said. They
are a new main library, the W. L. Moody Jr. Life

Science Building, the Richter Family Mathematics
& Engineering Center, a teacher-student dormitory,

cafeteria, and central power station.
The university's "Education 6000" program will
provide facilities and faculties for an expected enrollment of 6,000 students by 1975.
St. Mary's current enrollment of 3,500 makes it
the largest university in San Antonio and fourth
largest private university in Texas, after TCU, SMU,
and Baylor.
The new law center will provide facilities for
double the current law school enrollment of 368, said
Dean Ernest A. Raba.
The St. Mary's law school is an -outgrowth of
the San Antonio school of law established in 1927
by the San Antonio Bar Association and taken over
by St. Mary's in September, 1934.
It has been housed in a 100-year-old building on
the original site of the university in downtown San
Antonio.
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Newly -elected officers of Phi De lta -Phi A lumni Inn . l to R Justice Charles W. Barrow, Sec retaryTreas urer; J udg e A rchie Brow n, Pre sid en t, and l. Bruce Frybu rger, Vice -President.

Phi Delta Phi
Michael T. Moriarty, Magister of Tarlton Inn,
Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity announced the election of officers of the re-activated
Barrister Inn of Phi Delta Phi Alumni. Elected to
the post of President was Judge Archie S. Brown,
144th District Court. L. Bruce Fryburger was
elected Vice-President, and Justice Charles W.
Barrow, Associate Justice of the Fourth Court of
Civil Appeals was elected Secretary-Treasurer.
The election was conducted by mail and some
400 Phi Delta Phi alumni participated in the voting.
With the beginning of new officerships, new activities are being formulated which involve Alumni and
Students as one membership, and other activities
are being planned for the practicing bar and bench
of Phi Delta Phi alumni which will honor the alumni
group as an ·e ntity.
On Sunday, October 23, 1966, Tarlton Inn held
its Fall Cocktail-Dinner Rush Party at the Petroleum Club located in the Alamo National Bank
Building.
The Honorable James R. Norvell, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas was the distinguished guest speaker of the evening.
Among guests present were: Father Louis J.
Blume, S.M., President of St. Mary's University;
Justice Char 1 e s W. Barrow, Associate Justice,
Fourth Court of Civil Appeals; Justice Carlos
4

Cadena, Associate Justice, Fourth Court of Civil
Appeals; Dean Ernest Raba, Dean of St. Mary's
School of Law, and the Honorable Archie S. Brown,
Judge of the 144th District Court.
Judge Archie S. Brown, introduced Justice
Norvell for the evening's address. Justice Norvell
spoke about the anomalous person in law called "The
Reasonable Prudent Man.''
Father Louis J . Blume, President of the University, announced at the Cocktail-Dinner the signing of the Law School Contract as a part of the
E ducat'ion 6,000 program of development. This announcement was the first public release of this
major step toward a continuing betterment of legal
education.
PLEDGE CLASS
Magister Moriarty announced the fall pledge
class to be composed of the following students:
Phillip Benson
Richard Conner
Edward Costello
Art Estefan
Carson Fussell
Frazier Gorel
John Harris
Steve Harris
Bill Hyder
Fred Manning
Charles McConachie
Jack McGinnis
Robert Mueller
Charles Muller
Karl Rubenstein
Vick Putman
Lewis Vandiver

L

PAUL FERGUSON
APPOINTED TO
LAW FACULTY

St. Mary's University School of Law has recently added a new staff member. Mr. Paul Ferguson is the new Law Librarian.
Mr. Ferguson was born February 16, 1925, in
Danvers, Massachusetts. He got his BA degree from
Harvard College and his LLB degree from Boston
University School of Law. While attending Boston
University, he was on the editorial staff of the
Boston University Law Review. During 1943-1946,
he served as a Lieutenant in the United States
Marine Corps Reserve. A member of the Massachusetts Bar for thirteen years, he s·e rved as Law Librarian of the Essex County Law Library in Salem,
Massachusetts.
He is married to the former Mary Caulfield and
they have four children: Paul Jr., Peter, Anne, and
Mark. In addition to his duties as Law Librarian,
Mr. Ferguson will teach Legal Bibliography, Damages and Leg-al Research and Writing.
Q . In your former employment, what type of work
did you mostly perform?
A. I was engaged in the general practiee of law
in Massachusetts and specialized in appellate procedure and legal research for other attorneys on a
referal basis.
Q. In view of your legal research experience, do
you think that law graduates have an adequate
research background?
A. As Law Librarian of a court library and as an
attorney handling appellate cases, I found that law
school graduates for the most part indicated a need
for more training in the use of legal research material and in the field of legal writing generally. In
the latter instance, the deficiency may be caused
by some omission on the college and secondary
school level rather than in the law school curriculum.
Q. Could a s t u d e n t interested in learning the
methods of legal research learn them by reading a
legal research book?
A. It is difficult, if not impossible, for one to become proficient in legal research by merely reading

a text on the subject. The tools of legal research
must actually be us·ed by the student in solving
problems or writing legal memorandum.
Q. Besides the snow, is there any thing in Boston
in particular that you now miss?
A. Although at times I sense that there is a minor
language barrier, and I have not lost my "Boston
Accent," we are able to communicate with our fellow San Antonians. The children will undoubtedly
miss the snow, and New England in the fall and
spring of the year is truly beautiful.
Q. On the positive side, what has appealed to you
most about Texas and San Antonio?
A. I am enjoying San Antonio and Texas generally.
The people are most friendly and are more outgoing than the typical New Englander. The geography of the area offers many interesting contrasts, and my family and I are looking forward to
·e xploring the Southwest. My children are actually
becoming accustomed to having enchiladas on the
school lunch menu on Wednesdays instead of corn
beef and cabbage.
When I am asked, however, how I like San Antonio and Texas, I am reminded of the story of the
two dowager sisters from Boston who inherited
a beautiful estate in California overlooking the
Pacific. After they had lived in their new home
for several months, one sister asked the other how
she liked living in California and the other replied,
"It's all very lovely, but I deplore being three thousand miles from the ocean."
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About the Author
Richard J. Clarkson did his undergraduate work
at the University of Florida at Gainesville, Florida;
St. John Vianney Seminary, Miami, Florida, and
completed his work for an undergraduate degree in
philosophy and classical languages at St. Vincent de
Paul Seminary, Boynton Beach, Florida in 1964. In
1965 he completed a year of graduate studies in
Theology at St. Vincent de Paul Seminary in
Boynton Beach.
While at the University of Florida, Mr. Clarkson was the president of the Freshman Council and

a member of the Lambda Chi Alpha social fraternity, serving as a representative to the interfraternity council.
H·e worked on the preparation of the New
Catholic Encyclopedia at the Catholic University of
America, Washington, D.C. He is currently serving
as a Law Clerk to Professor James Castleberry in
the preparation of Professor Castleberry's contribution to a text on water law in the U.S .
Mr. Clarkson has pledged Delta Theta Phi legal
fraternity. He expects to graduate in 1968.

The Texas Law On Underground Water
by RICHARD J. CLARKSON
With each succeeding year, the use of underground water in Texas continues to grow. In 1958,
26 per eent of the acre-feet used for irrigation came
from: surface sources, but this dropped to 18 per
cent by 1'964. It is estimated that Texas farmers
used 10 million acre-feet of underground irrigation
water last year. An acre-foot is 326,851 gallons. 10
million acre-feet of underground water are equal
to the combined capacities of Lakes Texoma and
Rayburn. 1 As for municipal and industrial requirements of underground water, Texas used 994,400
acre-feet in 1959; by 1980, the requirem·e nts are
expected to reach approximately 1,300,400 acrefeet.2
As a result of this greatly increased use of
underground water, a number of areas in the state
have seen a significant drop in water levels. One
example involves the Carrizo-Wilcox aquifer (an
aquifer is a geologic formation which yields water
in sufficient quantities to constitute a usable supply), and where it has been developed and pumpage
increased, the water levels have declined. Thus,
a general decline in water levels has occured
in the Nacogdoches-Angelina County area
during the past twenty years due to periodic
increas·es in pumpage. In 1940, the CarrizoWilcox levels in southern Nacogdoches and
northern Angelina counties stood very near
the surface and several flowing wells were
reported. At present, nearly all wells penetrating the aquifer have ceased to flow .3
A report prepared for the Texas Water Commission
on the ground-water resources of the Nueces River
Basin stated that
the most serious problem associated with the
development of water from the Carrizo Sand
and Wilcox group, undifferentiated, in the
Nueces River Basin . . . (is that) . . . continuing declines in some areas have resulted
in lower yields and increased pumping costs. 4
Many areas of Texas as we have seen above
are depending more and more on underground
sources for their water. The resulting overdraft of
ground water which has occured frequently can
end in complete depletion of the saturated zone in
shallow basins or, more commonly, in the lowering
of water levels to a depth at which further pumping
becomes prohibitively expensive and ·e nough land
goes out of irrigation to bring the withdrawals into
6

balance with recharge. The economic effects on
water users are painful, to say the least. As water
lP.vels recede, large investments are required to
chase the supply downward. For example, wells
may be deepened, pump bowls lowered, and power
plants enlarged . And the cost of all these must come
out of the income produeed by the use of the water5 •
Now, having provided the reader with a few
prefatory remarks on the increasing importance of
underground water, and some of the consequent
problems in the life of Texas, we must proceed to
the major problems involved in any treatment of
the subject of underground water in Texas: the
problem of ownership and "waste."
The Texas Supreme Court in 1955 reaffirmed
in the Corpus Ch r isti V. Pleasant on Case6 the fact
that Texas follows the "English" rule as regards
the ownership of underground water. The Court's
appeal to authority rested in the main upon three
case: Acton v. BlundelF, Frazier v. Browns, and
the East ·C ase.9 These cases, sadly enough were
decided before (1843-1904) the developm~nt of
most of our present knowledge of geology and
hydrology.
The "English'' rule as found in the Acton v.
Blundell Case is stated thusly:
The owner of land through which water
flows in a subterranean course, has no right
or interest in it which will enable him to
maintain an action against a landowner, who,
in carrying on mining operations in his own
lands in the usual manner, drains away the
water from the land of the first-mentioned
owner. and lays his well dry.to
This case falls within the principle which gives to
the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface; that the land imm·e diately below is his property, whether it is porous rock or solid ground, or
venous earth, or part soil, part water; that the
person who owns the surface may dig therein, and
apply all that is there found to his own purposes
at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the
exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off
the water collected from underground springs in
his neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque
injuria, which cannot become the ground for action.
In the Dickinson v. Gr.and J unction Canal Co.
Case11 the Court said that the right to water is not

by a presumed grant from long acquiescence, but
if it exists at all it is jure naturae, and that the
rules of law that regulate the rights of parties to
the use of water are hardly, or rather not at all,
applicable in the case of waters percolating underground.
However. Chasemore v. Richards12 does a better job of stating the English viewpoint than the
Acton v. Blundell Case :
The right to running water has always been
properly described as a natural right just
like the right to the air we breathe ; they
are gifts of nature, and no one has the right
to appropriate them. There is no difficulty
in enforcing that right, because running
water is something visible and no one can
interfere without knowing whether he does
not do injury to those whose are above or
below him; but if the doctrine could be applied to merely percolating water, as if it is
flowing through the soil and eventually
reaching the same stream, it would always
be a matter that would require the evidence
of scientific men to state whether or not
there had been an injury. It is a process of
nature, not apparent, and therefore such
percolating water has not received the protection which running water in a natural
channel on the surface has always received.
The English courts set a definite precedent
for the decision reached in the Corpus Christi v.
Pleasanton Case when they said that one might
purchase land in order to secure the percolating
water for the purpose of furnishing a municipal
water supply and not be liable to the owner of the
adjoining land, although the wells thereon be
destroyed. 13
Many American jurisdictions adopted the
"English" rule and we find, perhaps, the best expression of its raison d'etre in the case of Frazier
V. Brown where the Court states that the movement of underground waters "are so secret, occult,
and concealed that an attempt to administer any
set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore, be practically impossible.'.14 For further American cases applying the "English" rule, s·e e: Greenleaf v. Francis 18 Pick. 117; Chatfield v. Wilson 28
VT. 49; Westmoreland Nat. ~Gas Co. v. Dewitt 130
Pa.235; Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45, 42 Am. Rep. 62;
Wardner v. Springfield, 90 Ohio Dec. (reprint) 855.
The landmark case in Texas determining the
ownership of underground water was Houston &
Texas Central Ry. Co. v. East,15 and it took its
rationale from the Frazier v. Brown 'C ase which
was mentioned above. The East Case determines
that percolating waters may be impounded to any
extent, regardless of the effect on the water supply
of the adjoining owners.
Although Mr. Arthur P. Duggan, Esq., said
hopefully in 1952 that: although it has been
widely assumed that Texas is irrevocably
committed to the absolute ownership theory
in the strictest sense, the Texas Supreme
Court in the H.&T.C. V. East case did not
express itself as to what the decision would
have been had the use not been considered

'reasonable' by the Court.16
We think the answer to Mr. Duggan's query was
found in Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton where the
Court stated that even though 63 to 74 per cent of
the water withdrawn from artesian wells and discharged into the river escaped through evaporation, transpiration and seepage and never reached
its destination to be put to a beneficial use that
this was not an unlawful use of the water. Now
if the word "reasonable" has any meaning at all,
it would s·eem that the Court was here saying that
the City of Corpus Christi could not be enjoined
from using the water unreasonably. In fact, the
Court seems to say that the only way that a landowner can be enjoined from the use of underground water taken from his own land is if the
water has been "wasted." The Court says that the
water is "wasted" only if it is put to an unlawful
use at its destination. The gravamen of the wrong
is made the fact that it is used for an unlawful
purpose and not the flowing of water into a conduit from which an unreasonable amount might
evaporate. The Court by judicial construction says
that the landowner cannot "waste" the water he
extracts from under his land, but so defines the
word that no consideration can be given to the
amount of water dissipated between the time of its
production and time of use. Thus, the Court has
construed itself out of the possibility of ever having "waste." One is perhaps reminded of a quote
from Lewis Carroll: "When I use a word," HumptyDumpty said, "it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less.'' With the ever increasing use of ground water in Texas, the implications of this are rather frightening. In light of
this, strong exception should be taken to the Court's
insistence on maintaining the "English" rule as
the law of Texas, and the basis on which it saw fit
to construe the statutes defining "waste" of artesian
well water.17
Mr. W. L. Matthews, Esq., perhaps states best
the inequity of the Texas law of underground water
as presently construed by the courts:
In the recent cas·es the Texas courts say
that the decision in the East Case bars the
recognition of "correlative rights." Since the
Supreme Court in the East Case, as well as
the subsequent cases, recognizes that each
owner of overlying land has an equal right
to take and exploit the underground water
from the common source, there is no question that their rights are correctly described
by the word "correlative."
W.hat the Court really means is that they
will put no restraint on an owner's activities
even though such activities destroy or nullify
the identical and equal rights of neighbors.
In other words, the courts refuse to grant a
rem·e dy for what ordinarily would be called
a wrong. Surely the landowner who desires
to take clearly excessive amounts of water
has no vested right to have this "no remedy"
rule applied against other landowners having equal rights in a common underground
source. 1s
In the following pages we hope to show the
inequities and anachronisms of Texas' following the
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"English" rule, and the Court's refusal to apply
reason in its construction of the meaning of "waste"
as defined in article 7602,R.C.S. 1925. Finally, we
shall make some proposals of our own.
In the Corpus Christi v. Pleasant'on Case, the
court in affirming the "English" rule appealed to
the East Case which followed the old English case
of Acton v. Blundell. The rationale behind this
English case, and in the cases following it, is that
the origin, quantity, movement and course of underground water was "so secret, occult and concealed."
Thus, the denial of the applicability to underground
waters of the general principles of law that obtain
with respect to waters upon the surface of the earth
is in part placed upon the mere difficulty of proving
the facts respecting water that is concealed from
view. But at this time such reasons are not valid
as our geologists now know how to trace underground waters and can determine their source. In
the words of W. L. Broadhurst, district geologist,
ground water branch, U.S. Geological Survey.
The amount of water that can be obtained
from an underground reservoir depends on
several factors which include permeability,
quantity of water in storage, rate of recharge,
and movement of water through the formation. Within reasonable limits, the modern
hydrologist can determine these factors and
thereby estimate the quantity of water that
may be pumped, ·e ither within a short time
or throughout a long period.t9
Our Texas Board of Water Engineers has conducted
state-wide reconnaissance studies determining the
amount and location of groundwater supplies. 20
Thus, when the origin, movement, quantity, etc., of
underground water is known, the reason for the
"English'' rule at once vanishes.
It has always been held to be the law, both in
England and Am·e rica, that underground flowing
streams can no more be interfered with than surface streams. Bearing this in mind, we fail to understand why a different rule should be applied to
underground (percolating) water when our geologists and hydrologists know as much about it as
they do our surface water. For as J. B. Clayberg
says:
The only difference between flowing streams
and diffuse percolating water is their freeness and rapidity of movement. All water,
no matter how infinitesimal the particles or
how large the volume may be, are governed
by the same law. In flowing waters there are
no sufficient natural impediments to prevent
rapidity of m o t ion , while in percolating
waters nature has placed many impediments
and their motion is much retarded. When a
raindrop falls on a mountainside and sinks
into the earth, unless it is destroyed or used
up, it will eventually reach a flowing stream
if there is any possible outlet thereto. Therefore, all drops of water should be considered as tributary to a flowing stream, although the process and period of reaching
the stream may be entirely different.2t
Since w·e can now apply the same rules to
underground waters as we do to surface waters, the
rule that replaces the "English" rule will be one of
8

correlative rights. 22 But can we take this venerable
common law and just throw it in the junk pile? This
author not only thinks we can, but that we should.
The "English'' rule was developed in a time of
water surplus and is suitable, perhaps, to the humid
regions of the Eastern United States.23 Texas, however ,is semi-arid and we find the common law
in this instance harsh. The reason for a water law's
existence should not be its antiquity but because it
has sound support in the hydrology of the region in
which the law is to have effect.24 The classic statement in defense of this view is found in the
Crookston Case; the Court said
In this country the English rule is not binding upon the American Courts. It does not
create rights and duties which American
Courts must recognize, as they would be compelled to recognize rights and duties created
by that common law which is a part of the
law of the land; like the law, for example,
of trespass to persons or property. The American Courts are confronted with varying and,
in many cases, utterly different geological
conditions and problems of water supply. It
is evident on its face that rules which might
work well in an island like England might
operate disastrously if indiscriminately applied to so diversified a continent as this,
with its overlying mountainous regions, its
well watered plains, its stretches of arid land
onee known as the 'Great American Desert;
and its different lake regions. Nothing is
better settled than that the fundamental
principles of right and justice, on which the
common law is founded and which its administration is intended to promote, require that
a different rule should be adopted whenever
it is found that, owing to the physical features and character of a state and the peculiarities of its climate, soil, products and
water supply, the application of a common
law rule tends constantly to cause injustice
and wrong rather than the administration of
justice and right. Water, although in a large
measure a commodity of commerce, is essential to the natural use of land for agriculture and other purposes, and to the support
of human life, itself.25
Professor Ira P. Hildebrand of the University
of Texas Law School as far back as 1927 said:
The California rule should certainly be followed in those parts of the state where the
soil is underlaid with enormous basins of
percolating waters. In such cases the owner
of a small tract of land should not be permitted to build a deep pit on his land and
impound all of the percolating water from
the adjoining tracts, but the waters should
be equitably distributed among the owners
of the soil above the water-bearing sand. 26
Indeed, it is to California, in the main, that we
must look to find underground water laws that could
be adopted by the Texas courts.
In the California case of Katz v. Walkinshaw,27
the Court refused to be bound by the "English" rule
relative to the ownership of percolating waters. Instead, the Court looked to the landmark case of
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Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 2s and upon the doctrine of "reasonable use" enunciated therein. "The
doctrine of reasonable use on the other hand affords
some measure of protection to property now existing and greater justification for the attempt to
make new developments.'' The Court applies the old
rule of non alienum laedas and practically holds
that the maxim cujus est solum does not apply.
The rule here announced is in effect that rights
to percolating water are correlative and that no
landowner absolutely owns the percolating water
beneath the surface of his land; that the same
right is held by each and all owners of land under
which percolating waters of any catchment basin
exist.
Judge Temple in his opinion in the Katz v.
Wa~kinshaw Case cites favorably the Smith v. The
City of Brooklyn Case, 29 and the Forbell v. The City
of New York Case.3o Following the Smith Case,
Judge Temple says:
In the absence of contract or enactment,
whatever it is reasonable for the owner to
do with sub-surface water, regard being had
to the definite rights of others, he may do.
He may make the most of it that he reasonably can. It is not unreasonable (emphasis
ours) so far it is now apparent to us that
he should dig wells and take therefrom all
the water that he needs in order to have the
fullest enjoyment and usefulness of his land,
as land, ·e ither for the purpose of pleasure,
abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or for whatever else the land as land
may serve. He may consume it, but he must
not discharge it to the injury of others. But
to fit it up with wells and pumps of such
pervasive and potential reach that from their
base the defendant can tap the water stored
in plaintiff's land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and by
merchandising it prevent its return, is however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its customers, unreasonable as to the
plaintiff and others whose lands are thus
clandestinely sapped and their value
impaired. 31
Thus we find California after the Case of Katz
v. Walkinshaw developing what is known as the
California doctrine of correlative rights. 1.) Owners
of all lands that overlie a common supply of percolating water have coequal rights of reasonable beneficial use of the water on or in connection with their
overlying lands; 2.) any surplus above their re·asonable requirements may -be appropriated for distant
use, or for public utility use within the area; 3.) in
the event of a shortage, the common supply may be
apportioned among the overlying landowners in proportion to their reasonable needs; 4.) rights in percolating waters physically connected with a surface
stream or other source of water-all of which sources
are considered a common supply-are correlated
with all other rights of use that pertain to such
common supply. 32
As we can see, the "California" doctrine is
much more refined than the original concept of the
rule of reasonable use. We can see what might have
been the result if the Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton

Case had been decided by the reasonable use rule.
Thus it was held that the property right of landowners conferred by statute in water flowing under
the surface of the land but not in a definite stream
is subj·e ct to the rule of reasonable beneficial use.
The doctrine of reasonable use limits the right of
the landowner to use such amount of percolating
waters under this land as may be necessary for some
useful purpose connected with the land. Where subterranean percolating waters constitute a common
source of supply, one landowner may not extract and
convey such waters from his land to the impairment or injury of prior reasonable beneficial use by
another landowner; and offending landowners, including municipalities, are liable in damages.
For a case closer to home, we have Enid v.
Crow, Oklahoma. 33 It appeared that the city by drilling a water well on property adjacent to the plaintiff's property and by withdrawing percolating underground waters for sale off the premises, had
reduced the Plaintiff's water supply. The landowners were entitled to damages under the rule thus
stated in syllabus 4 by the court, "Where an owner
of subterranean percolating waters withdraws such
waters for the purpose of transporting and selling
said water off the premises, resulting in a material
interference with a neighboring landowner's right
to the reasonable use of subsurface water on his
land, he is liable for damages thereby."
Among other cases holding that one landowner
is not entitled to take underlying percolating water
from a common source and transport it to distant
lands not overlying the common supply if such taking is injurious to other landowners occupyinO' similar positions with respect to that supply are Meeker
v. East Orange, 77 N.J. Lew 623, 74 A.379,
25L.R.A.,N.S.,465, 134 Am. St. Rep. 798; Schenck
v. City of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109,
L.~.A.1917 F, 684, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 267; Koch v.
Wick, Fla., 87 So. 2d 47; Rothranff v. Sinking Spring
Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A 2d 87.
The "California'' doctrine seems manifestly
more equitable and hydrologically correct for our
own semi-arid state; why have not the courts taken
advantage of the new advances in geological science
~nd s~t-aside the old "English" rule? Although one
In this day and time often hears criticism of the
rapidity with which some of our courts are settingaside long established laws, we think Chief Justice
Traynor of California cam·e closest to the truth when
he said, "The real danger to law is not that judges
may take off onward and upward, but that all too
many of them have long since stopped dead in the
tracks of their predecessors."34 The Texas courts
seem to prefer the reasoning of a law that was developed in another country having no hydrological
or geological similarities to our own state at a
time-over a hundred years ago-when all' under
the ground was "occult and mysterious." Some undisclosed premise must underlie that preference.
Until that premise has been brought out into the
open where we can see it and examine it we think
we may be forgiven for not being unduly cowed by
the tone of inevitability that the Court attaches to
its conclusions.
As mentioned above, the Corpus Christi v.
Pleasanton Case besides .reaffirming the "English"
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rule so construed the definition of "waste'' found
in REV. Civ. Stat. article 7602 that it virtually construed it out of existence. Justice Griffin (dissenting) stated the problem perfectly:
If no consideration is to be given the amount
of water that is dissipated between the
time of its production and time of use, then
we can never have waste.
The statute in question reads as follows:
Waste is defined for the purpose of this act,
in relation to artesian wells to be the causing, suffering or permitting the waters of an
artesian we I to flow into any river, creek or
other natural water course or drain, superficial or underground channel, bayou, or into
any sewer, street, road, highway, or upon the
land of any other person than that of the
owner of such well, or upon the public lands
or to run or percolate through the strata
above that in which the water is found,
unless it be used for the purposes and in the
manner in which it may be lawfully used on
the premises of the owner of such well.
As pointed out in Cantwell v. Zinser 3 5 art. 7602 is a
conservation statute enacted pursuant to the constitutionally declared policy of cons·e rvation of
natural resources, Constitution of Texas, art. 16,
Sec. 59 (a), and is in harmony with the definition
of "waste" contained in Section A ( 16) of art.
7880-3c, R.C.S., Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. As interpreted by the Court, article 7602 would have to be
interpreted as a license to commit waste, rather
than as a conservation statute.
What is rather ironic in this case is that the
Court in its strict adherence to past Court decisions
and its determination not to break new ground
seemed in this instance not to take cognizance of
a rather important passage in Cantwell v. Zinser
In (the East) Case the Court did not pass
upon the right of a person to intercept and
waste percolating water to the detriment of
an adjoining owner because such facts were
not before the Court. Authorities are cited
by the Court, however, which hold that such
right does not exist. We agree with such
holdings.
Waste of natural resources is against the
public policy of this state. Many conservation laws have been enacted by our legislature which evidence such policy. They apply
to privately owned as well as publicly owned
resources. These laws need not be cited as
they are generally known. We do call attention to articles 7600-7602, incl. Vernon's Ann.
Civ. St., which make the waste of water from
artesian wells, a nuisance.
Again in Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, Judge
Griffin in dissenting said:
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when courts have a choice to
construe statutes so that one construction
gives the statute a valid, legal and reasonable
(emphasis ours) construction which will effect the intent and purpose of the legislature in the passing of a law, or a construction which gives a statute no meaning to
accomplish the purpose for which it was
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passed and makes the statute void, meaningless and of no force and effect, and holds that
the legislature accomplished nothing and
only used a jumbled jargon of ineffective
words to bring about a negative result, then
the courts must give a statute the former
construction.
If the Court had wanted to construe the statute,
art. 7602, favorably and still rely on precedent what
more did they need than the East Case and Cantwell
v. Zenser? However, as the Court interpreted the
statute, of the 10,000,000 gallons withdrawn from
the artesian wells daily, all could be dissipated if
a cupful reaching the city were to be used for a
legal purpos·e. This is obviously a complete frustration of the n1eaning of the word "conservation."
Judge Wilson (dissenting), says:
The majority .feel compelled to this result by
the belief that the problem is primarily legislative. It is indeed commendable for a court
to impose upon itself a rigid self control in
refusing to trespass upon the legislative function, but I do not believe the courts to be
impotent in preventing such a waste and
especially so when existing legislation properly construed against common law background would prevent it.
Judge Cardozo was perhaps thinking of a situation
such as this when he said:
Judges march at tim·es to pitiless conclusions
under the prod of a remorseless logic which
is supposed to leave them no alternative.
They deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they
obey the bidding of their office. The victim
is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on
the altar of regularity.36
The majority, though feeling their hands were
tied, seen1 to have felt the unfortunateness of their
decision when they noted that the legislature was
to meet shortly after the delivery of their opinion
and that the legislature could make whatever
changes in the law it felt necessary.
It has been more than ten years since that
decision and the legislature has yet to act; however,
when and if it does, I propose the following points
for consideration: that it be recognized that the
rights of overlying owners in the subsurface waters
are correlative in nature; that one landowner may
not withdraw such waters for the purpose of transporting and selling said water off the premises
when it results in a material interference with a
neighboring landowner's right to the reasonable use
of subsurface water on his land; offending landowners, including municipalities, to be liable in
damages; that "waste" of subsurface waters be
defined as escape from beneficial use; that any
landowner in violation of this statutory definition
may be enjoined by any other owner or owners.
However, if the legislature cannot achieve this,
and retains current water rights which protect and
sustain gross inefficiencies, the community should
be given the power to tax or charge for the water
wasted. The definition of "waste" can be progressively tightened so that losses now considered "unavoidable" can be increasingly charged as a respon-

sibility of the right holder. Thus a water right may
eventually carry not only the assurance of a share
of the water but also a share of the responsibility
for such items as evaporation from reservoirs,
phreatophytes along ditches and canals and along
streams, and contaminants and pollutants in nonconsumptively used water. This would be a severence
tax.
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Delta Theta Phi
On September 25th, Bickett Senate held its
initiation and is proud to announce the following
new members: Arthur Abraham, Kirby Ambler, Ed
Chastaine, George Cooper, Douglas Drury, Frank
Ford, Alvaro Garza, Don Hendrie, Gerald Lopez,
P a ul Redman, and Guy Spiller. The ceremony was
held in the courtroom of Judge Hippo Garcia,
County Court at Law Number Two of Bexar County,
followed by a reception at the Old Heidelberg Inn.
Alumni and members of Bickett Senate were present
to preside in the function and welcome our new
brothers.
On October 15th, Bickett Senate held its Fall
Rush Banquet at the Four Brothers Restaurant.
Guest speaker was the Honorable James Barlow,
Bexar County District Attorney. Later in the evening members and honored guests were entertained
by a dazzling array of Spanish folk dancers, arranged by Mrs. Douglas Drury and Mrs. Alvaro
Garza, wives of two of the brothers. The evening
progressed with cocktails and dancing for 200 guests
and members.
Rush Week continued with a stag barbecue at
the suburban retreat of our Alumni Brother
Lamoine Holland. Attendance was by alumni member and rushees.
Rush Week resulted as one of the most successful with the acceptance of 34 new pledges to Delta
Theta Phi. Pledging ceremonies are expected to be
held on November 6th.
The following members are on the Dean's List,
Marcel N otzon, John J onietz, Stanley Burch, Gerald
Lopez, Wesley G. Knize, Weldon C. Byrd, Raymond
Manning, Wayne Priest and John Y. Harper.

Mrs. Harriet Owen, a senior student from
Austin, was recently elected president of the student
body at St. Mary's University School of Law. Running unopposed, she received a total of 147 votes.
Election officials said a total of 181 students
voted in the primary election on Monday, October
17, conducted by the Barristers Student Bar Association. A total of 112 students voted in the runoff
election shortly after the primary.
The 181 votes casted in the primary amounted
to slightly more than one-half of the students
eligible to vote.
Jesse Gamez was elected vice-president, winning over Richard Clarkson with a vote of 112 to
64. Elected to other offices were, Hector DePena,
secretary; Karl Rubenstein, treasurer; Richard
Haynes, historian; Pat Thomas, sergeant-at-arms;
Michael Schill, parliamentarian; and Vic Putman,
ALSA co-ordinator.
The only race formed into a runoff was that of
ALSA alternate. The winner was Bennie Bock.
President Owens said, "I want to thank those
students who ran in the ·e lection and also those who
worked at the polls. Without their effort we could
not have a student body association at St. Mary's."
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Th e Pres1:dent and Facu lty
of the
St. Mary's University School of Law
cordially 1:nvite you to attend the

Groundbreaking Ceremony for the
new Center of Law
Woodlawn Campus, 2700 Cincinnati A venue
11 o'clock in the m orning
Tuesday, No vember Twenty-second
N in eteen Hundred and Sixty-six
Please enter the campus
at the Ligustrum Street
entrance off W. Woodlawn Ave.

DEAN'S LIST
SUMMER SEMESTER 1966
At the end of each sem·e ster, those students
who have completed two full semesters of law work,
and whose cumulative average places them in the
upper ten per cent of the total student body, are
placed upon the Dean's Honor List, as students of
academic distinction, and their names are recorded
as a matter of permanent record. Only those
students carrying a normal load or more are eligible.
(8 hours-Day Division-3 hours-Evening Division).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

DAY DIVISION
Putman, Vick ····------------------------83.3
Notzon, Marcel C. ___________________ 82.6
Tedford, Charles _____________________ 81.7
Grant, Patricia _______________ ': __ 81.6
Owen, Harriet __________________________ 81.2
Jonietz, John __________________________ 78.2
Harris, Steve W. ______________________ 78.2
Bingham Lloyd ________________________ 78.0
Courtney, John ________________________ 77.8
Burch, Stanley E. ____________ ______ 77.0
Thomas, Patrick _______ _____ __________ 77.0
Williams, Donald ____________________ 75.8
Lopez, Gerald ____________________________ 75.8
Knize, Wesley G. ___________________ 75.7
Carson, Marion ________________________ 75.6
Byrd, Weldon C. ______________________ 75.4
Manning, Raymond _________________ 75.2
Estefan, Arthur __ __ __________________ 75.2
EVENING DIVIVSION
Hill, Roger C. ____________________________ 84.2
Taylor, Edwin A. ______________________ 82.4
Benson, Philip __________________________ 81.3
Gilbert, Marlin __________________________ 80.4
Priest, Wayne ________ __ _____________ ___ 80.4
Dawson, Emmett _______________ __ _____ 80.0
Holland, William E. _________ _________ 78.4
Harper, John Y. -~---------------------- 78.4
Adams, William ________________________ 77.8
SCHOOL AVERAGE ____ __________ 74.4

40
79
39
90
79
91
26
62
61
61
36
52
47
59
74
70
77
30
47
81
61
72
45
28
75
46
86
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